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Abstract
In South East Europe, and specifically in the Western Balkan region, the unfinished 
processes of regional consolidation have been heavily influenced by the European 
Union’s (EU) integration and conditionality policies. The United Kingdom’s (UK) 
planned withdrawal from the EU, in principle, can have different effects on the EU’s 
own further development. The magnitude of the EU’s ability to adapt positively to 
this challenging situation and the level of resistance by member states against the idea 
of re-nationalisation will be decisive factors for the specific scenario that will occur 
after Brexit is implemented. The analysed EU scenarios ‘dynamic re-launch’, ‘risky 
stalemate’ and ‘existential crisis’ differ significantly in regard to the EU’s further 
ability to stimulate the political actors in South East Europe so as to identify common 
interests and find compromises with long-lasting positive effects for the region’s 
development.
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Sažetak
Nedovršeni procesi regionalne konsolidacije u jugoistočnoj Europi, prije svega na 
zapadnom Balkanu, pod snažnim su utjecajem politike integracije i uvjetovanja 
Europske Unije (EU). Planirani izlazak Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (UK) iz EU, 






načelno, može imati različite utjecaje na daljnji razvoj EU-a. Razmjer sposobnosti 
EU-a za uspješnu prilagodbu ovoj izazovnoj situaciji i razini otpora zemalja članica 
ideji re-nacionalizaciji bit će odlučujući faktori za određeni scenarij, koji će nastupiti 
nakon implementacije Brexit-a. Analizirani scenariji EU-a “dinamičko ponovno 
pokretanje”, “rizični zastoj” i “egzistencijalna kriza” bitno bi se razlikovali, u odnosu 
na daljnju sposobnost EU-a da stimulira političke čimbenike jugoistočne Europe na 
identifikaciju zajedničkih interesa i iznalaženje kompromisa s dugoročnim pozitivnim 
učincima na regionalni razvoj.
Ključne riječi:
EU, Brexit, Jugoistočna Europa, utjecaj, konsolidacijski procesi,scenariji
Introduction
For those generations born after World War II, the European integration 
process has been a guarantor for constant democratic development, respect 
for human rights and prosperous economic cooperation. Various crises 
that have affected the Western world in general and Europe in particular 
during the last ten years have made many people uncertain about their 
future. These have included the global economic crisis, the huge fiscal 
crisis in Greece, the European Union’s (EU) challenges in developing a 
common migration and refugee policy as well as the global rise of terrorist 
attacks. The consequences in many countries have been the strengthening 
of anti-globalisation, anti-establishment and right-wing populist parties and 
movements, which have promised their growing number of voters a return 
of an era through re-nationalisation. While on the world’s political stage 
Donald Trump’s ‘surprising’ victory in the US elections, in November 2016, 
became a symbolic turning point, the EU received its alarming signal already 
five months earlier, in June at the so-called Brexit referendum. Yet, it is still 
unclear what the future political, economic and security costs of the planned 
British withdrawal from the EU will be, but undoubtedly, there will not be 
much time left for the Union to adapt itself to these new circumstances.
This article is focused on the following question: how will the possible 
changes in the EU after the implementation of Brexit influence the unfinished 
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peace and consolidation processes in South East Europe, which in the last 
17 years have been essentially dependent upon constructive and pro-active 
EU policies? The renowned British journal ‘The Economist’ predicted in 
an analysis, issued in late October 2016 and dedicated to this topic, that a 
return to a violent conflict in South East Europe is unlikely, despite ‘plentiful 
sources of political and social instability’. This source further stated that 
‘the political and economic fallout from the Brexit vote will, on balance, be 
neutral’ (The Economist, 2016a). This is certainly a possible scenario and 
perhaps the most likely one, but different EU scenarios, as a consequence 
of Brexit, could have a different impact on regional consolidation in South 
East Europe. Consequently, the method, which is applied in this article, 
starts with an analysis of what the main scenarios for EU’s post-Brexit 
development could look like. This part is followed by a stocktaking of the 
current transition process in South East Europe in the next chapter. Finally, 
in the last chapter, the different EU scenarios are discussed in the context of 
their possible effects on South East Europe.
Three Scenarios regarding the Post-Brexit EU Future
At the time of writing this article (in October/ November 2016), some of 
the key variables for the upcoming Brexit were still unclear. Amongst them 
were in particular the questions of when, specifically, the British government 
will officially inform the EU about leaving the Union and whether the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the EU will agree on a process that will result 
in a ‘soft Brexit’. This would firstly enable the UK to preserve privileged 
access to the EU’s internal market, following the existing arrangements 
of Switzerland and Norway with Brussels. Moreover, such a ‘soft Brexit’ 
would guarantee the free movement of people from the 27 EU members to 
the UK (The Economist, 2016b: p.11). The unfavourable alternative to this 
less painful divorce would be a ‘hard Brexit’ that would sever most of the 
previous ties and could politically and economically harm both sides much 
more. For example, for England, this could lead to serious political problems 
with Northern Ireland and Scotland, where the majority of citizens voted 
in favour of the UK’s EU membership (Die Presse, 2016: p.4). Even though 
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the UK government hesitated to officially submit the formal application for 
its withdrawal from the EU in the first months after the referendum, Prime 
Minister Theresa May stressed that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ (Hosp, 2016: p.3). 
The introduction of negotiations into the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in 
the first half of 2017 therefore seemed to be much more likely than a political 
turnaround of the UK government that would ignore the referendum results.
The UK’s most likely withdrawal from the EU in a medium-term period 
has provoked many discussions all over Europe on how this could impact 
the EU’s further development. The discussed scenarios will be summarised 
below. However, it must be stressed that Brexit cannot be measured as an 
isolated factor that impacts further EU developments. In this regard, it is 
one of the key factors apart from the EU’s and her (remaining) member 
states’ ability to find the right response to the financial crisis and economic 
challenges, ‘EU fatigue’ and the return of nationalistic and anti-democratic 
policies.      
Scenario 1: ‘Dynamic Re-launch’
In this (best case) scenario, Brexit would be used by the EU institutions to re-
launch the EU integration project and to re-gain ‘the hearts and minds’ of the 
EU citizens. Key member states, such as Germany, France and Italy, would 
be strongly engaged to find common EU positions to deal with the challenges 
of an institutional re-setting, migration and Euro crises. A majority of the 
other EU member states would support these reforms. With this serious 
engagement of constructive and cooperative European political leaders 
to re-strengthen the common European agenda, the rise of nationalistic 
parties in EU member states would be stopped, and, in turn, the erosion of 
liberal democratic values. In the opinion of the Harvard economist, Dani 
Rodrik, such a re-launch scenario would demand the deepening of political 
integration within the EU to the level of economic integration (Wipperfürth, 
2016: p.11). The new spirit of internal EU cooperation would become evident 
also in the field of security cooperation. Thus, the priorities described in ‘A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ would 
be dealt with by concrete joint EU action plans. These would be directed in 
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particular against threats that concern all EU citizens, such as, ‘terrorism, 
hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity’ 
(European Union Global Strategy, 2016: p.9). A stronger EU would enhance 
its efforts to contribute to the collective security of Europe. Hence, it would 
work closely together with its international partners, in particular NATO. 
As currently foreseen in the EU’s Global Strategy, the EU would cooperate 
substantially with the candidate countries from South East Europe to 
strengthen their resilience (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: p.9).
Scenario 2: ‘Risky Stalemate’
Currently, a development that will lead to scenario 1 is not perceived as a 
realistic option by many observers. Most of the EU insiders, for example, 
the former Austrian and EU diplomat, Stefan Lehne, expect that the 
coming years in the EU’s development will be characterised by a further 
‘muddling through’. In this scenario, the institutional framework of the EU 
would remain, in principle, functional but without further steps for deeper 
integration. Moreover, there would be no consensus inside the EU to adopt 
the necessary reforms to respond appropriately and in a united way to the 
abovementioned political, economic and security challenges. Anti-European 
and xenophobic political parties would further gain ground among the 
electorate. These nationalistic forces would not be able to destabilise the EU 
framework in the medium term, but would be strong enough to turn the 
traditional pro-European centre-left and centre-right parties into EU-sceptics 
(Kopeinig, 2016: p.7). In such a stalemate scenario, the Europeans would 
further dissociate from the ‘European idea’. Other relevant international 
actors, such as, Russia, given their geopolitical interests, would have an easy 
game to play the EU members states off against each other. Without serious 
pro-European countermeasures by key EU actors, a development into a more 
negative scenario, which will be described subsequently, would be possible.
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Scenario 3: ‘Existential Crisis’
In such a worst case scenario, the EU’s institutional framework would become 
evidently dysfunctional. In most of the member states, extreme euro-sceptic 
parties would come to power. Moreover, the Brexit virus would spread 
all over the EU. Nationalistic policies that dominate political life would 
impede any constructive European solutions. The symptoms of political 
and economic crises would be so strongly manifested that even the biggest 
EU supporters would turn away from the European integration project in 
its previous form and focus on more national(istic) positions. Decisive rifts 
between EU member states would lead to new geostrategic partnerships. 
European countries would either strengthen their relations with the United 
States (US) or build up closer relations with Russia. The ‘Westerners’ among 
the European states would try to preserve a rump EU. A similar re-composing 
and fragmentation could happen also inside NATO. Overall, Europe would 
face an uncertain future. Even bilateral conflicts that seemed to be settled by 
European integration could, after a number of decades, turn into a serious 
political or even security problem.
Intra-State, Bilateral and Regional Relations in  
South East Europe – A Stocktaking in Late 2016   
South East Europe–or, more concretely, the group of six countries labelled 
by the EU as ‘the Western Balkans’1–at first glance did not seem to be very 
alarmed by the results of the British EU referendum. The reason for this may 
lie in the political self-occupation that still characterises this post-war region 
in Europe. Indeed, the consolidation of cooperative neighbourhood relations 
is still a half-finished business in South East Europe. The legacy of the wars 
during the 1990s still represents a huge political and psychological barrier for 
achieving full normalisation of relations. Unsolved bilateral questions range 
from open border issues, legal disputes concerning suspected war criminals 
to minority issues. Instead of pragmatic and cooperative solutions these issues 
1  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia
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and disputes have, very often, seen nationalistic reactions in the concerned 
countries (Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, 2015). Beyond the 
various bilateral problems, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo are 
still regarded as fragile states by the EU and NATO. This explains the ongoing 
presence of peace-keeping troops (EUFOR and KFOR) there and the western 
intent to keep executive mandates (in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case, against 
the Russian intention), in order to be prepared for ‘all eventualities’. On the 
one hand, the outbreak of new wars in South East Europe in and outside the 
region–under the current political circumstances–is not seen as very likely 
or would even be excluded by observers as a possible scenario. On the other 
hand, it cannot be overlooked that the general trust in the self-sustainability 
of the peace and consolidation processes in South East Europe is very low. 
The intra-regional relations generally have suffered from a lack of trust. In 
the last twenty years, several political attempts have been made to push the 
reconciliation process forward–for example, as seen in the political efforts 
made by the former Croat and Serbian Presidents Ivo Josipović and Boris 
Tadić (Pavelic, 2012). Such attempts have been certainly useful and helpful 
in improving the political atmosphere for a short period, but they could 
not permanently replace the nationalistic paradigm via a stable cooperative 
framework. Nationalism has remained an often-used political tool for 
politicians in South East Europe, in particular during times of crisis.
The deterioration of Croat-Serb relations during the migrant crisis in the 
summer of 2015 was an illustrative example of this pattern. As a consequence 
of the questionable decision of the then-Croat government to close the borders 
temporarily to lorries coming from Serbia, the yellow press and even some 
of the leading politicians in the neighbouring country compared Croatia’s 
behaviour with that of the fascist Ustaša state, which existed in Croatia 
during the Second World War (slobodna-bosna.ba, 2015). Political tensions 
between the two countries have continued after the easing of the migrant 
influx. This is because of the different political narratives surrounding the 




Surveys show how easily citizens can be influenced by a nationalistic political 
climate and how negative stereotypes of former ‘enemy groups’ continue to 
persist. A survey that was published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the 
European Movement Serbia, in October 2015, revealed, for example, that 52 
percent of the interviewed persons in Serbia had neither a positive nor negative 
opinion of Albanians from Albania, 22 percent a mainly negative opinion 
and 11 percent a very negative opinion about their neighbours. Compared 
with this, 7 percent had a mainly positive and only 1 percent a very positive 
opinion about Albania’s population. 7 percent of the interviewed persons 
had no specific opinion on this issue (European Movement Serbia/Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, 2015: p.16). In another survey published in the same year 
by the Albanian Institute for International Studies and the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 42.5 percent of the interviewed citizens from Albania described the 
relations between Albanian and Serbian citizens as ‘normal’, 27.5 percent as 
‘bad’ and 7.2 percent as ‘very bad’. On the other hand, 13.8 percent of the 
interviewed persons described the mutual relations as ‘good’ and 2.6 percent 
as ‘very good’. Among the interviewed persons, 6.5 percent had no specific 
opinion on this issue (Cela, 2015: p.17). 
Unlike Croatia and Serbia, Albania and Serbia did not fight a war against 
each other during the 1990s, but the ‘Kosovo issue’ has impeded their 
relationship. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the interviewed persons 
were still impacted by the nationalistic incidents that followed a soccer 
match in Belgrade in October 2014 (Cela, 2015: p.5). Since regional relations 
are still politically fragile in South East Europe, theories of conspiracy and 
accusations of destabilisation can easily influence political developments. 
Among the incidents that caused political alarm in the second half of 
2016 were, for example, the detention of a suspected ‘Croat’ spy in Serbia 
(Petrović, 2016), the prevention of a presumed coup in Montenegro during 
the parliamentary elections that was supposedly supported by a former 
Serbian Gendarmerie commander (Đurić, 2016), and a foiled assassination 
attempt against the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić or his brother 
(Danas Online, 2016). 
Due to the inconsistency local ownership in South East Europe has shown 
in regard to political normalisation of regional relations and reconciliation, 
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EU’s role for regional consolidation from the perspective of late 2016 
remains essential. Despite the sceptical attitudes towards the EU, which in 
the meantime are even present among EU members, and various crises that 
the EU has been experiencing since 2008, the South East European candidate 
and aspiring countries keep EU membership as their most important, or one 
of their most important, strategic goals. More political realism can be seen 
on the side of the political leaders in South East Europe compared to earlier 
phases of EU enlargement. By now, there is high awareness among them 
that the process of becoming an EU member will be a medium- to long-term 
venture. It is emphasised by regional politicians that implementing the EU’s 
democratic, legal and other standards is as essential as the future membership 
in this organisation2. Although such announcements have become part of the 
expected mainstream rhetoric in recent times, they maintain, in principle, 
the EU’s opportunity pro-actively to influence consolidation issues in South 
East Europe through–somewhat limited–conditionality policies.
This is supported also by the fact that, in the candidate countries, a relative 
majority of the citizens–though there is a downward trend–still declare 
themselves in favour of EU membership. Thus, according to a Eurobarometer 
survey from May 2016, in Serbia, 37 percent have a fairly or very positive 
attitude towards the EU, 24 percent a fairly or very negative attitude. In 
Macedonia, 56 percent have a generally positive opinion about the EU, while 
14 percent have a negative one. Similar results came from Montenegro: 55 
percent have a fairly or very positive attitude towards the EU, in contrast to 
13 percent with a negative attitude. In Albania, 72 percent think favourably 
about the EU and only 4 percent in a fairly or very negative way. In Croatia, 
which has been an EU member since July 2013, 37 percent perceive the EU 
in a positive way, in contrast to 19 percent, who have a negative opinion 
(European Commission, 2016). According to a poll from 2015, Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina–which among the South East European countries draw 
most of the attention from the EU and NATO due to their complex internal 
challenges and neighbourhood relations–differentiate noticeably with 
2  During their discussion at the Belgrade Security Forum on 13 October 2016, this was 
stressed for example by the Prime Ministers of Albania and Serbia, Edi Rama and Aleksan-
dar Vučić.   
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regards to their citizens’ EU attitudes. Thus, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
whose State Presidency officially made in February 2016 an application to 
become an EU candidate country,–which Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia already are–there is little enthusiasm. According to this survey, 
only 30 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s citizens have a positive attitude 
towards the EU, while 26 percent have a negative opinion. In contrast to 
that, 89 percent of the Kosovar citizens think positively about the EU, 
despite the fact that, within the region, their country is furthest away from 
EU membership. Only 2 percent of the Kosovars have a negative attitude 
towards the EU (Regional Cooperation Council, 2015: p.45).
In terms of an assumed or actual ‘enlargement fatigue’ within the EU, the 
so-called ‘Berlin Process’ is an important signal for the South East European 
candidate countries that their efforts to be integrated in the EU will be 
supported further by the Union. Initiated by Germany in 2014, its main 
goal has been to provide a complementary process to EU integration that 
will foster a ‘closer regional cooperation in view of achieving sustainable 
economic growth, full-fledged market democracy, and reconciliation’ 
(Lilyanova, 2016: p.2). In three summits that took place so far in Berlin 
(2014), Vienna (2015) and Paris (2016), particular projects were addressed, 
which should support the reduction of unemployment–above all among 
young people–, the creation of an ‘Energy Community’ in South East 
Europe and the connectivity agenda in regard to investments. Under the 
IPA II, the EU Commission has provided up to € 1 billion for connectivity 
investments and technical assistance, especially for transport links and 
infrastructural projects. Other focal points have been, so far, the fostering of 
youth cooperation and civil society as well as addressing bilateral disputes 
in South East Europe. In this latter context, the political representatives of 
the six Western Balkan countries signed a declaration at the Vienna summit 
on solving bilateral border, political and minority disputes. Further, they 
committed themselves to not block their neighbours on their path towards 
EU membership (Lilyanova, 2016: pp.3-7).
Without calling into question the possible beneficial impact of the Berlin 
Process on the regional relations in South East Europe, it should be noted 
that some key challenges, which are connected with regional consolidation, 
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will demand regional and international efforts that reach far beyond. 
This is particularly still the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
The aim of Bosnia and Herzegovina to catch up soon with the other EU 
candidates is seriously impeded by the current attempts of the leadership 
of the Republika Srpska to undermine the common state, in order to achieve 
separatist objectives (The Economist, 2016c). Croat politicians in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina still talk about the politically ‘disadvantaged position’, in 
which the Croat population would be in this country, compared to the other 
two constituent peoples, the Bosniaks and Serbs (Krešić, 2016). In turn, the 
Bosniak politicians are blamed by the Croat and, even more, by the Serb side 
for striving towards a centralised state that would endanger the national 
identity of these two national communities. Different interplays between 
domestic and external actors additionally complicate the consolidation 
of this state. While the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina rely on Zagreb, 
Brussels and (somewhat less) on Washington, politicians from Republika 
Srpska seek, in particular, support from Belgrade and Moscow. Russia’s role 
during the Putin era in the context of South East Europe has turned from a 
constructive partner of the West, at the beginning of the stabilisation process, 
into a political actor that has openly supported nationalists among Serb 
politicians and has counteracted further enlargement of NATO and, more 
recently, the EU (Sarajlić-Maglić, 2015). Bosniak politicians share with the 
Croat side the goal of integrating into the EU and–unlike Serb politicians–
into NATO. However, there is also an increasing influence from Turkey, 
which has become more suspicious since President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
started to increase restrictive policies in his own country (Wölfl, 2016). It 
seems that under these complex internal and external conditions the path to 
EU integration is one of the rare goals, which connects the present leadership 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact underlines also from this angle the 
necessity of preserving an EU that is effective and able to act pro-actively.
The EU’s pro-active role is at least equally necessary in case of the normalisation 
of relations between Belgrade and Priština/Prishtina. Although negotiations 
about the solution to the daily problems of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo 
have been taking place since 2011–supplemented by a political dialogue 
that started two years later–mistrust still seems to be large between the two 
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political sides, and also between the two national communities in general. 
From the Kosovo-Albanian perspective, the Serbian government ‘abuses’ 
the dialogue, in order to create their national community within Kosovo as 
a state within the state, following the example of the Republika Srpska in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, for the Serbian government, 
Kosovo still is an autonomous part of Serbia. The recognition of Kosovo as 
an independent state for Belgrade remains a completely excluded option. 
This stance again mobilises nationalist forces among the Kosovo-Albanians, 
who, like the nationalist party Vetëvendosje, have demanded an immediate 
stop to the technical and political dialogue with the Serbian government and 
who have already shown their readiness to use violence to underline this 
demand (Jureković, 2015: pp.7, 10).
Compared with the current global hot-spots like Syria or Iraq, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo in recent years have become peaceful places. But 
due to the abovementioned antagonisms, the EU and NATO do not trust 
this kind of unsatisfying stability in both countries. That is the reason why 
operations and missions with executive mandates like the EU military 
operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the NATO 
PfP military presence through KFOR in Kosovo, or the EU Rule of Law 
mission in this country have been prolonged several times. This kind of 
‘security net’ could become unnecessary only when the EU, but also NATO 
enlargement, will be successfully finished in the Western Balkans–provided 
that both organisations will pass through these ongoing, dynamic global and 
European changes relatively unscathed. Until then, it will be essential for the 
South East European countries to achieve progress in regard to the targeted 
democratic, legal and economic standards and to develop recognisable future 
perspectives for youth. If this does not happen, the fuses of smaller powder 
kegs–outside Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo–could ignite again. This 
applies above all to Macedonia’s not fully consolidated interethnic relations 
and the political polarisation in that country (Radio Free Europe/ Radio 
Liberty: 2016 a). The latter point is also currently evident in Montenegro, 
which has generally performed well so far in its EU and NATO integration 
process, but whose citizens are relatively divided with regards to geopolitical 
and identity issues (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2016b). Constructive 
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regional relations and economic investments would be the best guarantees 
to secure good relations between the Serbian state and its Albanian minority 
in the Preševo Valley as well as with the Bosniak community in the Sandžak 
region. Both ethnic communities have a close relationship with their ‘mother 
countries’ Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
Apart from conflicting national or political issues, South East Europe–like 
other parts of Europe too–has been increasingly challenged by extremist 
forms of Islamism. Intensified measures that have been introduced by law 
enforcement agencies in South East Europe from 2015 have almost stopped 
the inflow of foreign fighters that seek to join the terrorist organisation 
‘Islamic State’. Until then, almost 800 Balkan Islamists, in particular from 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Sandžak, went to the Middle 
East (Wither, 2016: p.51). Although the majority of the Muslims in the Western 
Balkans practice tolerant forms of Islam, the risk of having an intensified 
inflow of young people to extremist Salafi movements should not be 
underestimated. International support for increasing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
and Kosovo’s state functionality as well as substantial contributions to 
the economic improvement of the whole region could be useful counter-
strategies.
The Post-Brexit Scenarios and the Western Balkan Context
As described before, in the author’s view, the EU’s own future will have 
an essential impact on the way South East Europe, specifically, how the 
Western Balkan countries, will deal with the unfinished tasks in their semi-
consolidated relations. Therefore, it seems obvious to look back at the three 
Post-Brexit scenarios, which were analysed at the beginning, and to reflect 
briefly about what each scenario could mean for the presently still fragile 
political, social and economic setting in South East Europe.
The best case, a ‘dynamic re-launch’ of the EU that would start even before 
the UK definitely leaves the Union, would first of all–most likely–guarantee 
that the enlargement process will continue in South East Europe. It can be 
assumed that the EU Commission, in such a scenario, would again strengthen 
its engagement in the accession process as well as with those regional and 
34
Predrag Jureković
bilateral issues in South East Europe, which could further impede progress 
of the candidate and aspiring countries. In a re-launch scenario, the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Security and 
Defence Policy would be upgraded. Therefore, the EU would be very keen 
on proving that it is a credible actor in the international arena. Viewed 
in this light, to support South East Europe substantially in finishing its 
consolidation would be a basic prerequisite for the EU. This would mean, for 
example, to transform the presently unfrank technical and political dialogue 
between Belgrade and Priština/Prishtina into a transparent political process 
that would lead to: (a) the signing of a basic treaty aimed at achieving full 
normalisation of political, social and economic relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo and (b) giving security guarantees to the Serb community in Kosovo 
as well as to Kosovo in regard to its relationship with Serbia.
In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a pro-active EU policy 
would be characterised by clear language when addressing those politicians 
who have stuck to manipulative policies and have, by doing so, stifled real 
progress in this country since 2006. If there are no other means left, the EU 
should not shrink from imposing financial and economic sanctions against 
such obstructive individuals. On the other hand, in such a dynamic re-launch 
scenario, the extension of beneficial means would dominate. This would 
mean, for instance, that the ‘Berlin Process’ would develop a large pulling-
effect for Foreign Direct Investments, so that there would be little margin for 
nationalist policies, and much more for constructive ideas and cooperation. 
Fostering standards of liberal democracy in the whole region would again 
become a core issue for the EU, after a period in which these values–as a 
consequence of the pressure of the extreme political right within the EU–has 
been put into the background.
For the political leaders in South East Europe, the EU’s re-launch option 
would mean that the time of hidden political agendas is definitely finished 
and that only a frank, transparent and cooperative attitude leads to progress 
in the whole region. Most of the political leaders would internalise this 
political attitude. Thus, the consolidation process, including regional 
reconciliation, would improve and the implementation of ‘EU standards’ 
would become a part of Realpolitik. Under such positive conditions, the next 
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candidate countries from South East Europe–Montenegro most likely being 
the first–would become an EU member between 2021 and 2025.
A ‘risky stalemate’ scenario, compared to the previous one, would 
certainly make a difference for South East Europe in that EU integration 
would further lose momentum. Thus, the EU’s conditionality policies 
would become increasingly a toothless tiger with a decreasing impact on 
regional consolidation. In a political EU environment, in which nationalistic 
movements and populist parties would be successful in constantly 
increasing their electoral support, manipulative and authoritarian policies 
would continue to flourish in South East Europe as well. The problem fields 
that were analysed in the chapter on regional stocktaking would neither 
be necessarily further exacerbated nor even escalate, but there would be 
little stimuli for constructive and cooperative solutions. South East Europe 
somehow would be kept imprisoned in its own political and economic 
stagnation, without having a promising perspective. As a consequence 
of absent EU investments, the lack of legal security for investors–due to 
missing reforms–and insufficient regional cooperation, economic growth 
in South East Europe would come to a standstill between 1 and 3 percent. 
This would be too little for successfully fighting the high unemployment, in 
particular among youth. As a result, frustrated voters would prefer populist 
messages from nationalistic parties that again would not do any good to 
regional consolidation.
Due to the EU’s weakness, the geopolitical splitting within South East Europe 
would proceed, by sharpening different spheres of influence that gravitate 
either towards Ankara, Brussels, Moscow or Washington. Since the political 
interests of these centres would in some cases differentiate largely, these 
geopolitical divisions would further harm regional cooperation in South East 
Europe. In a scenario of ‘risky stalemate’, nationalistic hidden agendas–for 
example, in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo–would remain 
a potential risk. Additionally, there would be an alarming move of young 
Muslims to intolerant and extremist Salafi groups (Ilić, 2016). Thus, the 
security net through peace support operations of the EU and NATO would 
be maintained–however, without any clear perspective for an exit strategy. 
Since in such a scenario intra-state polarisation in some of the candidate 
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countries–for instance in Macedonia and Montenegro–would continue to 
exist in parallel to the enlargement fatigue within the EU member states, the 
accession of a new member in a medium-term perspective would seem very 
unlikely. 
While in a ‘risky stalemate scenario’ there is still an opportunity for 
positive change in the EU itself, and also in South East Europe, the worst-
case scenario of ‘existential crisis’ could partly destabilise the Western 
Balkans. In a situation in which the EU is about to implode as a political 
and economic association, the main priority of the ‘rump EU’ would be to 
consolidate itself–there would be no political energy left to deal pro-actively 
with South East Europe. Such a constellation would be the ideal scenario 
for some of the authoritarian and nationalist regional politicians, who could 
push radical rhetoric and policies without any international sanctions. In 
fact, their destructive policies would have become ‘the mainstream’ also 
in the disintegrating EU. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, separatist Serbian 
politicians would most likely introduce the formal separation of Republika 
Srpska, which could provoke incalculable reactions from the Bosniak side. 
This would replace their previous preference for a state concept, in which 
citizenship is emphasised, by a rigid Islamic identity. As a consequence, 
also within the Croat community, serious doubts could arise concerning the 
viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic state and there could be 
aspirations to integrate the Croat majority parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
into the Republic of Croatia. The latter, as well as Serbia, would be–at least 
politically–heavily involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s existential crisis 
with an uncertain outcome. The probability of a violent development in 
such a worst-case scenario would depend on whether there would still be 
international peace-keeping troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
A similar escalating situation in a ‘scenario of existential crisis’ would develop 
in relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The bilateral dialogue, as a result of 
a lack of EU mediation, would be stopped. Previous agreements would lose 
any significance. The Serb community, north of the river Ibar, would again 
be totally separated from the rest of Kosovo. Attacks on Serbs in the Albanian 
majority territories would significantly increase. In case of a missing NATO 
peace-keeping presence, Serbia would threaten the Kosovo government with 
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military intervention. As collateral damage resulting from the deterioration 
of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the inter-ethnic tensions 
in southern Serbia, in the Preševo Valley as well as in Sandžak, would rise 
dangerously. Likewise, in Macedonia, the longstanding fragile inter-ethnic 
coexistence would be dramatically challenged by the fact that one of the rare 
common political interests of Albanians and Macedonians, namely the goal 
of becoming a member of the EU and NATO, would have no chance to be 
implemented. Finally, it could be assumed that also in Montenegro, as a result 
of the ‘existential crisis scenario’, political conflicts along different identity 
lines, in particular between the supporters of Montenegrin state sovereignty 
on the one hand, and the supporters of a state-reunion with Serbia on the 
other hand, would considerably increase. As a whole, South East Europe 
in the scenario of ‘existential crisis’ would pass through various dangerous 
political crises that could also include violent confrontations.                    
Conclusion
As this analysis tried to convey, the different pathways, which can be 
taken by the EU and its member states following the planned Brexit can 
influence in a positive or in a negative manner reform processes and regional 
consolidation policies in South East Europe. The analysed scenarios–
’dynamic re-launch’, ‘risky stalemate’ and ‘existential crisis’–would, in very 
different ways, stimulate the political actors in South East Europe to identify 
common interests and to find compromises with long-lasting positive effects 
for the region’s development.
In a scenario of ‘dynamic re-launch’ it would be most likely that progress 
could be achieved in the open intra-state, bilateral and regional issues 
through a re-strengthening of the EU’s integration and conditionality 
policies. Compared with this, the scenario of ‘risky stalemate’ would exclude 
any substantial progress in improving regional relations and would include 
the risk of serious nationalistic setbacks. In the worst case scenario–labelled 
the EU’s ‘existential crisis’–South East Europe would enter a phase of 




As this analysis has established, the EU still plays an essential role in the 
Western Balkans in supporting democratization efforts and the normalization 
of regional relations that could otherwise slide into new dangerous conflicts. 
This fact should give a boost to those political forces inside the EU institutions 
and among EU member states which, regardless of the current crises, remain 
committed to the idea of European integration and cooperation. On the other 
hand, the political decision-makers in the Western Balkans have to increase 
their awareness that, particularly in times marked by great uncertainties on 
the global and European level, constructive and – in the best case – good 
neighbourly relations help to keep the waters calm.        
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